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Board Independence in Light of the Murdoch
News Corporation Scandal
Elina M. Lae*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 2011, news broke of a scandal that involved hacking by
the U.K. newspaper, News of the World, into the voicemails of a mur-
der victim and of relatives of soldiers killed in Afghanistan and Iraq,
among others. The U.K.'s top police official has resigned over the
scandal,' the Prime Minister's Director of Communications has been
arrested, 2 and the newspaper itself has been shut down by James Mur-
doch, CEO of the U.K. subsidiary that owned the paper. Despite all
of this, the independent board members of the publicly-traded U.S.
parent corporation, News Corporation, have been idle "amid the
widening scandal."3 While no director has publicly denounced News
Corporation, as New York Times corporate critic Andrew Ross Sorkin
would have expected, Thomas J. Perkins, director since 1996, has, in
fact, publicly defended News Corporation.4 This is particularly curious
because Perkins had also sat on the board of Hewlett-Packard (HP)
and resigned from that position while simultaneously accusing "HP of
illicitly [hacking] his personal cell- and home-phone records."5
This Article explores the function of the board of directors in light
of the Murdoch scandal, with the working hypothesis that there is a
link between the board being beholden to the CEO-in this case, me-
* J.D. 2012 (magna cum laude) University of Michigan Law School; LL.M. & LL.B. 2007,
University of Helsinki, Finland. I thank professor Jeffrey H. Miro for inspiring this Article and
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1. Sarah Lyall & Don Van Natta Jr., An Arrest and Scotland Yard Resignation Roil Britain,
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/world/europe/18hacking.html?
pagewanted=all.
2. Scotland Yard (Metropolitan Police Service), N.Y. TIMEs, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ref-
erence/timestopics/organizations/s/scotland-yard/index.html?scp=4&sq=andrew% 20coulson&st
=se (last updated Aug. 22, 2011).
3. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Murdoch's Board Stands By as Scandal Widens, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 18, 2011, 9:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/murdochs-board-
stays-silent-as-scandal-widens/.
4. Id.
5. Carol Hymowitz et al., News Corp. Director Perkins Says He's Leaving Company at 79
Because of Age, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-02/news-
corp-names-breyer-to-board-as-directors-tom-perkins-cowley-depart.html (emphasis added).
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dia mogul Rupert Murdoch-and how the board handled the corpo-
rate crisis. After putting forth the various possibilities and factors, this
Article will seek either to confirm the hypothesis or to put forth an
alternative explanation.
Sorkin has tacitly made the inference that the lack of independence
of the directors not only is the cause of the reticence of the board with
regards to the scandal but also has contributed to the corporation's
follies in acquisition decisions. Sorkin has pointed to News Corpora-
tion's $580 million acquisition of MySpace, presumably poor opera-
tion of the social networking site and later having to sell it for just $30
million.6 Moreover, Sorkin has underscored News Corporation's writ-
ing off, in associated losses, nearly half the price of the acquisition of
Dow Jones as one of "a series of strategic missteps that appeared to be
more about indulging [Rupert] Murdoch's personal interests than
helping the company."7
In asking whether the News Corporation crisis would have been
handled better if the board members had been more independent and
in his criticism of the acquisitions, Sorkin seems to have made two
assumptions: (1) that board independence improves company per-
formance (discussed in Part III); and (2) that the existing standards
for board independence are not high enough (discussed in Part II).
II. STANDARDS OF INDEPENDENCE
A. The Existing Standards for Board Independence
Are Not High Enough
Sorkin has pointed out that seventy-six-year-old Kenneth Cowley"
is a former, long-term executive of News Corporation; however, under
the stock exchange rules, Cowley is considered independent.9 As
other journalists have pointed out, Viet Dinh, another director who is
considered independent, is godfather to the second child of Lachlan
Murdoch, Rupert Murdoch's eldest son.'0 James W. Breyer, who has
6. Sorkin, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Kenneth Cowley stepped down from the board of News Corporation in September of 2011,
three months after the scandal broke. Jeremy W. Peters & Matt Richtel, News Corp. Board
Undergoes a Shuffle, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Sept. 2, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://mediade-
coder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/news-corp-board-undergoes-a-shuffle/.
9. Perkins resigned from the board of News Corporation in September of 2011. Hymowitz et
al., supra note 5.
10. Id.
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joined the board as a new, independent board member," has com-
pleted several ventures with News Corporation through Accel Man-
agement, Inc., in which Breyer is a general partner; moreover, there
are investments between Breyer and Rupert Murdoch's wife.12
Breyer's board membership record at Wal-Mart includes several con-
flict-of-interest transactions, and his withdrawal from the Dell board
was due to shareholder dismay at his less than 25% attendance at
board meetings. 13 CtW Investment Group has asked, through a for-
mal letter to Dinh, in Dinh's capacity as the Chairman of the Nomi-
nating and Corporate Governance Committee, for more
comprehensive disclosure of these details about Breyer.14 "Natalie
Bancroft, an opera singer, was named to the board when [News Cor-
poration] acquired Dow Jones, mainly as a way to . . . placate its for-
mer owners, the Bancrofts. Incidentally, [rejecting all other, more
experienced candidates put forth by the Bancrofts,] the News Corpo-
ration picked Ms. Bancroft."' 5
B. Different Standards of Board Independence
Despite the criticisms by mass media and shareholders about the
lack of independence of the board members who News Corporation
claimed were independent, these board members nominally qualify as
independent under the listing requirements of NASDAQ.1 6 One of
the possible causes for the confusion may be that there are too many
differing standards across varying sources, such as the standards of the
stock exchanges, those imposed by federal law and enforced by the
SEC, and that of Delaware state law. Furthermore, some have ques-
tioned whether the independence standard is high enough from any
single one of these sources.' 7
1. Federal Law on Board Independence
There is little federal law on board independence; however, as a
reaction to the Enron accounting fraud scandal, Congress's intent in
11. Press Release, News Corp., News Corporation Nominates Jim Breyer for Election to
Board of Directors (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.newscorp.com/news_507.html; see also
News Corporation, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 21, 2011).
12. See Hymowitz et al., supra note 5; see also Letter from Richard Clayton, Research Dir.,
CtW Inv. Grp., to Viet D. Dinh, Chairman, News Corp. (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ctw-investment-group-questions-independence-of-new-
news-corp-director-james-w-breyer-129531803.html.
13. Letter from Richard Clayton to Viet D. Dinh, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. Sorkin, supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., Peters & Richtel, supra note 8.
17. See infra Parts II(B)(1)-(4).
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enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was to push public
companies from managerialism towards board primacy.' 8 Director
primacy has been perceived as the most efficient resolution to the col-
lective action problem that is generated by the complex decisions in-
volved in managing a corporation.' 9 Even though some have argued
for shareholder primacy, 20 Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge has pro-
moted director primacy instead, arguing that it is inherent in the man-
agement structure of a corporation.21 Although SOX itself did not
include many substantive provisions on board independence (except
with regard to the audit committee), it effectuated major reforms indi-
rectly through changes to the stock exchange listing rules implement-
ing SOX.22
Most importantly, section 301 of SOX requires that the audit com-
mittee have the exclusive power to appoint the company auditor and
that all audit committee members be independent.23 Under this defi-
nition of independence, audit committee members cannot receive
compensation from the company, other than board fees, and cannot
be affiliates of the company or its subsidiary. 24 However, SOX does
not provide its own definition for affiliate, as Professor Donald C.
Clarke has noted.25 Instead, SOX has been interpreted to have
adopted the Investment Company Act of 1940's (the Investment
Company Act) definition, under which anyone owning 5% or more of
the company's stock is an affiliate. 26 Curiously enough, the Invest-
ment Company Act itself does not see stock ownership as a bar to
18. Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 303-06.
19. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 155-56 (2008).
20. The loudest voices are perhaps those of shareholder activists. See generally Ready, Set,
Dough, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17633111.
21. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 200-35.
22. Id. at 176-87.
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).
24. Id. This definition is fairly strict compared to, for example, NASDAQ and NYSE listing
rules' general definitions of independence, which allow receipt of up to $120,000 of consultancy
fees without the director being disqualified from independence. NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc.,
NASDAQ Stock Market Rules § 5605(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2012) [hereinafter NASDAQ Stock Mar-
ket Rules]; NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b)(i)-(ii) & cmt.
(2012) [hereinafter NYSE Listed Company Manual].
25. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73,
92 (2007).
26. Id. (explaining that section 301 of SOX amends section 10A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and that under section 3(a)(19) of the Exchange Act, "affiliate" has
the same meaning as under the Investment Company Act).
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independence. 27 To address the confusion, the SEC has created an
explicit safe harbor that a director who owns less than 10% of the
company's stock does not lose independence because of such
ownership. 28
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) also imposes a requirement of
independence on the members of the compensation committee.29 The
factors considered in this determination are "the source of compensa-
tion of a member of the board of directors of [a company] including
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee paid by the [com-
pany] to such member" and whether the director is an affiliate of the
company or its subsidiary.30
2. SEC Disclosure Requirements Related to Board Independence
The SEC requires disclosure on proxy statements of whether each
director is independent of management.31 Public companies also have
to disclose all categories of transactions, arrangements, and relation-
ships that were taken into account in the independence determina-
tion,32 but law professor J. Robert Brown, Jr. has critically remarked
that requiring the disclosure of merely the categories of relationships
is not enough and that disclosure of the relationships themselves
should be required instead.33 Brown's criticism is similar to the con-
cerns expressed by CtW Investment Group in its letter regarding the
disclosure of investments between Breyer (or his company) and News
Corporation (or the Murdoch family). Even if the investments had
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3), (a)(19)(A).
28. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No.
8,220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,788, 18,793 (Apr. 16, 2003).
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-3 (West 2010)).
30. Id. § 952(a)(3)(A). Even though section 301 of SOX provides a clear and strict definition
for the independence of audit committee members, the Dodd-Frank Act merely sets these two
parameters-fees and affiliation-to consider in defining the independence of nominating com-
mittee members. See Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, Securities Act Release
No. 9,199, Exchange Act Release No. 64,149, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,422, 38,427 (June 27, 2012). This
leaves the stock exchanges with discretion to adopt their own definition of independence for
nominating committee members. Id. The Investment Company Act and the Internal Revenue
Code have their own independence requirements, but those are outside of the scope of this
Article.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2012).
32. Id.
33. J. Robert Brown Jr., The NYSE and the Problems of Director Independence: The Need for
SEC Reform (Part 4), THERACETOTHEBOrrOM.ORG (June 2, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.the
racetothebottom.org/independent-directors/2010/6/2/the-nyse-and-the-problems-of-director-in-
dependence-the-need.html.
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fallen under the categories considered by the board in the determina-
tion of the independence of Breyer, News Corporation would have
been allowed to leave out the details from the public filings.
Those in favor of more scant disclosure could respond, however,
that disclosing actual relationships that were deemed immaterial
would defeat the purpose of limiting disclosure to only material rela-
tionships because all relationships that were even considered would
then be disclosed. The backfire would be a more limited evaluation of
different factors by the board to avoid automatically subjecting all
evaluated relationships to disclosure.
Further disclosure required by the SEC rules includes disclosure of
any interlocking directors; namely, whether any of the executives of
the company serve on the compensation committee of another com-
pany and whether that company has any executives that serve on the
compensation committee of the disclosing company.34
Additionally, the SEC can bring an enforcement action against a
company for false or misleading disclosures. As a part of such an en-
forcement action, the SEC also wields the measure of seeking an in-
junction to bar a given director from serving on corporate boards of
any public company during a specific number of years.35 For example,
the SEC imposed a five-year ban on Martha Stewart as a part of her
settlement of the insider trading charges brought against her.36
3. Independence Under Stock Exchange Listing Standards
The stock exchanges, too, have reacted to Congress's intent to in-
crease director primacy by giving more power to independent direc-
tors in at least two ways. First, independent directors have to meet
regularly without inside directors in so-called executive sessions.37
The official comments to the NASDAQ listing rules suggest that such
34. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407.
35. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, § 201(2), 104 Stat. 931, 935-36 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006)) (ad-
ding section 20(e) to the Securities Act of 1933 and section 21(d)(2) to the Exchange Act).
These sections provide that, in any case of willful or reckless fraud, a court may prohibit a person
from acting as an officer or director of a public company-"conditionally or unconditionally, and
permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine"-but only upon a showing of
"substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director. Id.
36. See Shira Ovide, Martha Stewart Is Out of SEC Jail, WALL Sr. J. DEAL J. (Sept. 26, 2011,
9:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/09/26/marth-stwart-is-out-of-sec-jail/; Press Release,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Settle SEC's Insider Trading
Charges (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-134.htm.
37. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(b)(2); NYSE Listed Company Man-
ual, supra note 24, § 303A.03.
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sessions should be held at least twice a year.38 The comments to the
NYSE listing rules suggest once a year.39 However, the "emerging
best practice," as Bainbridge has remarked, is to hold such a session in
connection with every regular board meeting. 40 Second, both NYSE
and NASDAQ require-in addition to the independent audit commit-
tee members per SOX-that the members of the nominating commit-
tee and the compensation committee also be independent. 41
The NASDAQ and NYSE listing standards are, for the most part,
overlapping in their requirements of director independence; therefore,
the subsections below discuss them in parallel, pointing out the parts
where the rules differ.
a. General Definition of Independence
Pre-Enron, the NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules required that a
board have at least three independent directors.42 Now, the listing
rules of both stock exchanges require that the majority of the board
consist of independent directors.43 At the start of the scandal, News
Corporation reported that nine of sixteen directors were indepen-
dent. 44 The company counted Cowley, Dinh, Breyer, and Bancroft
among the nine, despite their connections to News Corporation, Ru-
pert Murdoch, or his family members.45 Whereas the rules of NAS-
DAQ (on which News Corporation is listed) state in merely general
terms that "Independent Director means a person" who does not have
"a relationship which .. . would interfere with the exercise of indepen-
38. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(b)(2) & IM-5605-2.
39. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.03 & cmt.
40. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 178.
41. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(d)-(e); NYSE Listed Company
Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.04(a), 05(a). The NASDAQ rules do not require listed compa-
nies to have a compensation committee, but the NYSE rules do. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules,
supra note 24, § 5605(d) & IM-5605-6. Under the NASDAQ rules, if a company does not have a
compensation committee, the applicable independence requirements apply to the whole board.
Id. § 5615(c)(2). An exception to the requirement of having an entirely independent compensa-
tion committee and nomination committee (or the equivalent group of independent directors
under NASDAQ) is made for controlled companies. Id. § 5615(c) & IM-5615-5. They are not
required to have independent directors in their compensation and nominating committees, but
are required to have independent audit committees. See id. § 5615(c)(2); NYSE Listed Com-
pany Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.00.
42. DIANE E. AMBLER ET AL., SARBANES-OXLEY Acr: PLANNING & COMPLIANCE
§ 5.02[D][2][a] (2005 & Supp. 2008).
43. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(b)(1); NYSE Listed Company Man-
ual, supra note 24, § 303A.01.
44. Sorkin, supra note 3.
45. Id.
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dent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director," 46
NYSE goes into more detail by defining that a director is considered
independent if he has no material relationship with the company, tak-
ing into account "commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal,
accounting, charitable and familial relationships, among others." 47
Under both sets of rules, the board has to take into account any per-
sons and organizations with which the director is affiliated-besides
considering the director personally.48 Also, the board itself makes the
determination of independence, to the chagrin of Brown as discussed
in Part II(B)(2). 49
Both sets of listing rules make an exception to the majority inde-
pendence requirement in the case of companies with a controlling
shareholder.50 As Clarke has noted, this shows that the exchanges
view independence as a protection of the shareholders from manage-
ment.51 Even though News Corporation has a dual-class stock struc-
ture and the Murdoch family trust owns 38% of the voting shares,52
News Corporation does not qualify for the exemption because, ac-
cording to the NASDAQ listing rules, only shareholders who have
more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors-
either as an individual or as a group-count as a controlling
shareholder.53
Brown has criticized the stock exchange listing rule definitions of
independence because they focus on the director's relationship with
the company without capturing the director's relationships with man-
agement.54 For example, in the merger of Black & Decker and Stan-
ley Works, an independent committee approved a hefty post-merger
compensation package to the CEO, including, for example, a $45 mil-
46. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
47. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(a) & cmt.
48. See id.; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2) & IM-5605.
49. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a) & IM-5605 ("The board has a
responsibility to make an affirmative determination that no .. . relationships [that would impair
the board's independence] exist . . . ."); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24,
§ 303A.02(a) ("No director qualifies as 'independent' unless the board of directors affirmatively
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company.").
50. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5615(c)(2); NYSE Listed Company
Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.00.
51. See Clarke, supra note 25, at 93-94.
52. See Sorkin, supra note 3.
53. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5615(c) & IM-5615-5.
54. See J. Robert Brown Jr., The NYSE and the Problems of Director Independence: The
Plain Meaning of NYSE 303A.02 (Part 2), THERACETOTHEBOTrOM.ORG (June 10, 2010, 9:00
AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/independent-directors/2010/6/1/the-nyse-and-the-
problems-of-director-independence-the-plain.html.
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lion synergy bonus.55 Curiously enough, the CEO, who was the bene-
ficiary of the package, also participated in the decision of nominating
the members of the independent committee that approved the pack-
age.5 6 Furthermore, one of the committee members had an outside
business relationship with the CEO related to a $200 million project
developing a luxury recreational community.57 None of these facts
were subject to mandatory disclosure under the stock exchange rules.
When faced with these facts, Black & Decker issued a press release
explaining why it had not disclosed the outside business relationships
in its public filings, explaining that "[p]ersonal business relationships
between individuals (as opposed to relationships with the company)
generally are not relevant to the independence tests under the
[NYSE] rules because they do not create a material relationship be-
tween a director and the company." 5  Even though Black & Decker's
statement seems like an accurate description of the NYSE listing re-
quirements, representatives of NYSE intervened and advised Black &
Decker that such relationships would, in fact, have to be taken into
account in the determination of independence. 59 The seeming conflict
between this statement by the NYSE and the wording of its listing
rules (and the official comments thereto) creates some unclarity as to
what exactly has to be disclosed.60
In SEC v. Krantz, the SEC challenged the independence of the au-
dit committee members who were personal friends of the CEO (a
long-time neighbor, a family friend who regularly attended family so-
cial functions, and a long-term friend and insurance agent).61 Under
55. Joann S. Lublin, Black & Decker CEO Stands to Get Big Payday, WALL. ST. J. (Mar.
10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704145904575112023406207574.html?
KEYWORDS=black+and=decker.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Press Release, Black & Decker, Black & Decker Provides Additional Information in Con-
nection with the Special Meetings of Stockholders to Consider the Stanley Transaction (Mar. 9,
2010), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=114416&p=irol-bdknewsArticle&
ID=1408428&highlight=.
59. Even though NYSE did not make its statement in public, Black & Decker released an-
other statement the day after its initial statement that revealed the NYSE's view. Press Release,
Black & Decker, Black & Decker Issues Further Statement in Connection with the Special
Meetings of Stockholders to Consider the Stanley Transaction (Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtmlc=114416&p=irol-bdknewsArticle&ID=1408429&high
light=.
60. See Colin J. Diamond, Director-Management Relationships Under Stock Exchange
Independence Standards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 4, 2010,
9:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/04/director-management-relationships-
under-stock-exchange-independence-standards/.
61. Complaint, SEC v. Krantz, Civil Action No. 0:11-cv-60432 (S.D. Fla. 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21867-directors.pdf.
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the stock exchange listing rules, all of the three directors could, how-
ever, be considered independent.
At least Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has not
found it problematic to have friends of the CEO count as independent
directors for the stock exchange majority independence require-
ment.62 According to Lipton, "There is absolutely no basis for sec-
ond-guessing a board's reasonable determination that a friend of the
CEO, or a friend of another director, is independent." 6 3 Lipton, along
with his colleagues, notes that the "concept of directors as remote
strangers and the board as primarily an agency for the discipline of
management, rather than as an advisor to management in setting the
strategic course of the corporation, is contrary to all prior experience
and will not lead to better performance." 6 4 Brown has noted that if
friends of the CEO were so irreplaceable because of their special
skills, they could well serve as non-independent directors.65
b. Employment or Compensation by the Company
The NASDAQ and NYSE rules provide some clear-cut guidance
that a person who has been employed as an executive or a non-execu-
tive employee by the company or its parent or consolidated subsidiary
during the prior three years can never be considered independent. 66
Neither can a director who has received (or whose family member has
received) non-director compensation-e.g. consultancy, legal or ac-
counting fees, etc.-from the company (or its parent or consolidated
subsidiary) in excess of $120,000 during any twelve-month period dur-
ing the three years prior to the nomination. 67 The $120,000 limit does
not, however, include director's fees.68 Brown has criticized the stock
62. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance Adrift, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Mar. 18, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/03/18/corpo-
rate-governance-adrift/.
63. Id.
64. Memorandum from Martin Lipton et al., Partners, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some
Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2010 18 (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://www.wlrk.com/
docs/thoughtsfordirectors20lO.pdf.
65. J. Robert Brown Jr., Directors and FOCs (Friends of CEO), THERACETOTHEBoT-
TOM.ORG (Mar. 19, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/independent-directors/
directors-and-focs-friends-of-ceo.html.
66. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(A); NYSE Listed Company
Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(i).
67. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B); NYSE Listed Company
Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(ii).
68. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B)(i); NYSE Listed Com-
pany Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(ii). The $120,000 limit also does not include compen-
sation to a family member of the director who is a non-executive employee of the company.
NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B)(ii): NYSE Listed Company Man-
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exchange rules for not counting the director's fees in setting the
threshold for independence;69 however, it is important to note that
meeting one of the bright-line rules does not necessarily mean that the
director is independent. 70 The board still has to evaluate the direc-
tor's independence under the general NYSE or NASDAQ indepen-
dence test.71
c. Relationship with the Company Auditor
Under the NYSE rules, a director is not independent if she is a cur-
rent employee or partner at the company's internal or external audi-
tor.7 2 In this respect, the NYSE rules are stricter than the
corresponding NASDAQ requirement, under which an affiliation with
the outside auditor disqualifies the director but affiliation with the in-
side auditor does not.7 3
d. Stock Ownership
Under the NASDAQ rules, ownership of the company stock does
not, in and of itself, preclude a board's finding of independence.74
The NYSE rules explain that "even a significant" stock ownership
ual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(ii) & cmt. The mere fact that the director's family member has
been an employee of the company does not strip the director of independence, even if such
family member received more than $120,000 in regular employment compensation. NASDAO
Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B)(ii); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra
note 24, § 303A.02(b)(ii) & cmt. On the other hand, a family member having received compen-
sation as an executive or consultant will count towards the $120,000 limit. NASDAQ Stock
Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B)(ii); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24,
§ 303A.02(b)(ii) & cmt. Tax-qualified retirement benefits do not count towards the $120,000
either. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(B)(iii); NYSE Listed Com-
pany Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(ii). Under the NASDAQ and NYSE rules, being an
interim executive officer does not disqualify a director from being independent after the interim
period has ended unless it lasted for more than a year. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra
note 24, § 5605(a) & IM-5605; NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(i) &
cmt.
69. See Brown, supra note 33.
70. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6,542, 6,572
n.239 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006).
71. See id.
72. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(iii)(A). Also, a director is
not independent if her immediate family member is a current partner at the company's internal
or external auditor. Id. § 303A.02(b)(iii)(B). Similarly, if a family member of a director is a
current employee of the company's internal or external auditor and personally works on the
company audit, the director is not independent. Id. § 303A.02(b)(iii)(C). Even if a director or a
family member of the director was an employee or a partner at the company's internal or exter-
nal auditor within the preceding three years and personally worked on the company audit during
that time, the director is not independent. Id. § 303A.02(b)(iii)(D).
73. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(F).
74. Id. § 5605(a) & IM-5605.
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does not bar a finding of independence because the independence of a
director is independence from management rather than from the com-
pany as a whole.75 As scholar-practitioner Bruce F. Dravis has noted,
this seems to be in conflict with the wording of the general rule that a
director's relationships with only the company, and not, for example,
personal relationships with managers, are considered in evaluating
independence. 76
The fact that the stock exchanges do not consider stock ownership
as prohibiting independence shows that their concept of independence
differs from the one put forth by the SEC.77 Under the SEC's defini-
tion, independent directors should not have ties to the shareholders or
management; the stock exchanges, in contrast, perceive it as a good
thing that independent directors own stock and that their and the
stockholders' interests are aligned.78
e. Transactions with the Company
Under the NYSE rules, a current employee or executive officer of
another company (or the family member of a current executive officer
of another company) cannot be an independent director of a listed
company if that other company has had a significant transaction with
the listed company within the preceding three fiscal years.79 A trans-
action is considered significant if the value "exceeds the greater of $1
million, or 2% of such other company's consolidated gross reve-
nues."80 The corresponding NASDAQ rule requires that:
[A] director [not be] . . . a partner in, or a controlling Shareholder
or an Executive Officer of, any organization to which the Company
made, or from which the Company received, payments for property
or services in the current or any of the past three fiscal years that
exceed 5% of the recipient's consolidated gross revenues for that
year, or $200,000, whichever is more.8'
75. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(a) & cmt.
76. See BRUCE F. DRAvis, THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 16 (2010).
77. Clarke, supra note 25, at 93-94.
78. Id. When the SEC implemented SOX, it put forth the safe harbor provision allowing
directors who own no more than 10% of company stock to be independent. See supra Part
II(B)(1).
79. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(v).
80. Id.
81. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(D)(i)-(ii). For example, the
outside legal counsel of a company could qualify as an independent director on the board of the
company as long as her legal fees do not exceed $120,000 if the attorney is in a sole proprietor-
ship, see supra Part II(B)(3)(b), or 5% or $200,000, if the attorney is in a law firm. NASDAQ
Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a) & IM-5605. Such an attorney could not, however,
serve on the audit committee. Id.
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Breyer seems to have a history of violating this requirement.82 His
company, Accel Management, Inc., engaged in a joint venture with
Wal-Mart to spin off walmart.com in 2000;83 later, in 2011, Wal-Mart
purchased Kosmix, Inc. from Accel and other investors for a reported
$300 million.84 During all of this, Breyer was on the Wal-Mart board
as an independent director.85 This example shows how lack of action
by NASDAQ or the NYSE against violations of listing requirements
renders the requirements nearly toothless.
The significant transaction rule does not apply to purchases of com-
pany stock.86 Presumably, News Corporation's acquisition of Dow
Jones from the Bancrofts would not render Natalie Bancroft non-in-
dependent as a director of News Corporation in the eyes of
NASDAQ. 87
f. Compensation Committee Interlocks
Under both the NYSE and NASDAQ rules, an interlocking director
cannot be considered independent until three years after the director's
employment or service as executive at the other company has ended.88
g. Charity
Under the NASDAQ rules, the amounts for charitable donations
correspond to those for business transactions. 9 The NYSE, in con-
trast, does not apply the same test to charitable relationships as to
business relationships, and charitable contributions never lead to au-
tomatic disqualification. Instead, the board has to consider charitable
82. Letter from Richard Clayton to Viet D. Dinh, supra note 12.
83. See id.
84. Id.; see also Ty McMahan, Will Wal-Mart's Kosmix Deal Inspire Other Retailers?, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/04/20/wal-marts-kosmix-
deal-may-inspire-other-retailers/?mod=google-newsblog; Chris V. Nicholson, Wal-Mart Buys
Social Media Firm Kosmix, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:36 AM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2011/04/19/wal-mart-buys-social-media-site-kosmix/.
85. See James Breyer, FoRBES, http://people.forbes.com/profile/james-w-breyer/51425 (last
visited Mar. 4, 2013) (stating that Breyer has served as an independent director on Wal-Mart's
board since 2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 14,
2006).
86. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5605(a)(2)(D)(i).
87. See id.
88. Id. § 5605(a)(2)(E); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(b)(iv). The
SEC rules define "interlocking director." See supra Part II(B)(2).
89. A donation in excess of $200,000 or 5% of a charity's gross revenue by a listing company
leads to automatic disqualification of the charity's executive from being an independent board
member on the donating listing company's board. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 24,
§ 5605(a)(2)(D)(ii) & IM-5605.
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relationships as part of the general director independence
consideration. 90
h. Consequences of Noncompliance
The CEO has to personally certify that a listed company is in com-
pliance with the independence standard.9' Prior to January 1, 2010,
the CEO had the obligation to disclose any material noncompliance
with the independence standard. Since then, the disclosure require-
ment was elevated to include any noncompliance. 92 Such a disclosure
has to be made in company proxy statements.93
The enforcement of the NYSE and the NASDAQ independence re-
quirements is indirect: listed companies must make accurate disclo-
sure as to whether they are in compliance with the rules.94 If a
company's disclosure is misleading, it may face liability for violations
of the federal securities laws. In cases where the disclosure was incor-
rect due to genuine error, however, it is not clear what the sanction
would be other than the shaming mechanism targeting the company's
CEO, as Clarke has noted.95
4. Board Independence Under Delaware Law
Notwithstanding the concerns of Clarke, as far as substantive law is
concerned, the most progressive independence reforms have come
from the changes to proxy disclosure requirements and to the stock
exchange listing rules, as Professor Myles L. Mace noted in 1979.96 In
fact, this still held true in 2011-the independence requirements put
forth by the stock exchanges and the proxy disclosure requirements
are way ahead of state law on this topic.
90. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.02(a) & cmt. In addition, com-
panies must disclose charitable contributions exceeding $1 million or 2% of the organization's
gross revenues if an independent director of the company served as an officer of the organiza-
tion. Id. § 303A.02(a) & Disclosure Requirement ("The listed company must comply with the
disclosure requirements set forth in Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K.").
91. See NASDAO Stock Market Rules, supra note 24, § 5625; NYSE Listed Company Man-
ual, supra note 24, § 303A.12.
92. This was a change imposed by federal law to reflect the change in Item 407(a) of Regula-
tion S-K. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 24, § 303A.12(a) ("Each listed company
CEO must certify to the NYSE each year that he or she is not aware of any violation by the
listed company of NYSE corporate governance listing standards, qualifying the certification to
the extent necessary.").
93. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2012).
94. See supra notes 91-93.
95. Clarke, supra note 25, at 88-89.
96. See Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV.
293, 298-302 (1979).
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While state law imposes no general independence requirement on
board members, the interpretation of the monitoring board institution
by the Delaware courts provides directors with almost complete pro-
tection from liability, as Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell has noted.9 7
Thus, the board has a high incentive to strive for independence. 9 8
Independence is particularly relevant in conflict-of-interest transac-
tions because approval of such a transaction by disinterested board
members gives the transaction the protection of the business judgment
rule.99 In this context, the more accurate term is "disinterestedness,"
which refers to the lack of director financial interest in the specific
transaction. 00 Independence, in contrast, means that the director,
even though not personally interested, is also not "dominated or con-
trolled by a materially interested director."' 0
Under Delaware state law, under which most public companies are
incorporated, board independence is a highly fact-driven inquiry.102
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, "Independence means
that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the sub-
ject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influ-
ences." 03 The courts inquire:
[W]hether the director's decision resulted from that director being
controlled by another. A director can be controlled by another if in
fact he is dominated by that other party, whether through close per-
sonal or familial relationship or through force of will. A director
can also be controlled by another if the challenged director is be-
holden to the allegedly controlling entity. A director may be con-
sidered beholden to (and thus controlled by) another when the
97. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE 17, 54-58 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010). For a discussion on the "mon-
itoring board" insitituion, see infra Part III.
98. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 175-76.
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) ("No contract or transaction between a corpo-
ration and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corpora-
tion, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers,
are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this
reason.").
100. Clarke has attempted to clarify the discourse on board independence by distinguishing
from independence two other concepts, "outside director" and "disinterested director," which
are sometimes used interchangeably with "independent director," but refer to a narrower cate-
gory of directors. Clarke, supra note 25, at 99-102. Clarke explains that outside director means
a director who is not a company employee. Id. at 100. This concept is widely used under Ger-
man, U.K., and Japanese corporate law, but it has no use under U.S. law. Id. Disinterested
director, in turn, refers to a director who does not have a financial interest in the transaction in
question. Id. at 102-04.
101. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002).
102. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049
(Del. 2004).
103. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
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allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power (whether direct
or indirect through control over other decision makers), to decide
whether the challenged director continues to receive a benefit, fi-
nancial or otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so de-
pendent or is of such subjective material importance to him that the
threatened loss of that benefit might create a reason to question
whether the controlled director is able to consider the corporate
merits of the challenged transaction objectively.104
Under McMullin v. Beran, director independence is evaluated
under "a subjective actual person standard to determine whether a
given director was likely to be affected in the same or similar circum-
stances." 05 "To establish that a board . . . lacked independence, a
plaintiff must allege facts as to the . . . lack of independence of the
individual members of that board."1 06 The key to the plaintiff's suc-
cess is to point to specific details that have resulted in the director's
beholdenness rather than to make conclusory allegations; 07 the plain-
tiff has to plead the lack of independence with specificity under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.108
a. Controlling Shareholders and Dominating Company Founders
In Aronson v. Lewis, a case involving a 47% shareholder, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court explained that less-than-majority stock owner-
ship can never prove lack of independence and that even majority
stock ownership cannot, in the pre-suit demand context, prove lack of
independence without additional evidence of personal or other rela-
tionships.109 Because the Murdoch family has less than half of the
voting power, its ownership would not suffice for disproving indepen-
dence in a pre-suit demand." 0
The Delaware courts have taken a similar position toward company
founders. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Technology, Inc.,
independence of a director was not put into doubt by the fact that he
was a co-founder of the company even though he had to consider a
demand to sue another co-founder. 111 In Jacobs v. Yang, the Dela-
104. Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50.
105. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Orman, 794 A.2d at 22.
107. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) ("The complaint must be verified and must state with particu-
larity any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members; and the reasons for not obtaining
the action or not making the effort." (emphasis added)).
109. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
110. Sorkin, supra note 3.
111. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 21, 1999).
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ware Chancery Court did not find a director incapable of considering
a demand to sue two founders of the company even though the exis-
tence of the company allegedly depended on those founders. 112
Surprisingly, the mere existence of a controlling shareholder who is
also chairman of the board and an executive does not create an as-
sumption that she would lack independence unless the plaintiff is able
to show other relationships between the directors and the controlling
shareholder." 3 In Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,
Inc. v. Stewart, Stewart had 94% of the voting power of the company,
but the Delaware Supreme Court did not think that this would have
sufficed for lack of independence to consider the pre-suit demand,
even in combination with facts that established a personal friendship
between the directors and Stewart.114 It would seem that much of the
presumed questionability posed by Sorkin as to the independence of
the News Corporation directors, based on their friendship with Ru-
pert Murdoch, would not hold up in a Delaware court, at least in the
context of a pre-suit demand.
b. Mere Approval of Transaction or Customary Board
Fees Do Not Suffice
It is also clear that the mere fact that the director took part in an
approval of a transaction that is contested by a shareholder in a suit is
not sufficient to make the case for lack of independence." 5 For exam-
ple, in Aronson, the directors had approved an employment contract
that did not make the compensation contingent on the employee's
ability to perform services to the company.116 A shareholder chal-
lenged the contract as waste of corporate assets, asserting that de-
mand was futile." 7 According to the shareholder, the directors lacked
independence because they themselves had approved the contract.",,
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the same directors could val-
idly make the decision as to how to respond to the shareholder de-
mand to bring a lawsuit against them.119 This was because the plaintiff
112. Jacobs v. Yang, No. Civ.A. 206-N, 2004 WL 1728521, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2004), affd,
867 A.2d 902 (Del. 2005).
113. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1054
(Del. 2004) (discussing the 94% shareholder, Martha Stewart).
114. Id.
115. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984); Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Coul-
ter, No. Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002).
116. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808-09.
117. Id. at 809-10, 817-18.
118. See id. at 817-18.
119. Id
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had not sufficiently pled a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 120 Presuma-
bly, the case would have come out differently if the plaintiff had suc-
ceeded in making the case that the approval of the contract, in fact,
constituted a waste of corporate assets by the directors.
Also, a director does not lose her independence merely because she
has received fees for sitting on the board. As the Delaware Chancery
Court articulated in Orman v. Cullman, as long as the fees are within
the range of "usual and customary," a director will not lose her inde-
pendence.121 In Security Police & Fire Professionals of America Re-
tirement Fund v. Mack, a New York state court, discussing demand
futility, found that yearly board fees ranging from $325,000 to
$376,733 were, on their face, customary, and that the plaintiffs failed
to rebut the presumption of independence because they did not prove
otherwise. 122 On the other hand, in In re National Auto Credit, a mas-
sive increase in directors' fees in return for the directors' support of
certain agreements raised reasonable doubt about the directors' inde-
pendence. 123 Similarly, in Kahn v. Portnoy, a director's independence
was put into question because he had also received payment as the
trustee of an investment trust controlled by another director. 124
In Jacobs v. Yang, the court explained that even though the director
stock option plan in place for the Yahoo directors may have amounted
to "substantial remuneration" of the directors, the nominating com-
mittee, which was in charge of nominating candidates for continued
board membership, consisted of other independent directors. 125 Be-
cause the founders of the company, to which the independent direc-
tors were allegedly beholden, were not in charge of the continued
board tenure of the independent directors, even substantial board fees
could not strip the directors of their independence.126
c. Personal Friendship and Familial Ties
If the cause of the lack of independence is personal friendship, the
Delaware courts seem to be reluctant to find a lack of independence
120. Id.
121. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 29 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2002).
122. Sec. Police & Fire Prof'ls of Am. Ret. Fund v. Mack, 917 N.Y.S.2d 527, 541 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010), appeal dismissed, 940 N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
123. See In re Nat'1 Auto Credit Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768, at
*8-9 (Del Ch. Jan. 10, 2003) (noting that the court perceived that increase in the directors' fees
stripped the directors of their disinterestedness rather than their independence, which demon-
strates, however, that the two concepts often overlap).
124. See Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC, 2008 WL 5197164, at *11-13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008).
125. Jacobs v. Yang, No. Civ.A. 206-N, 2004 WL 1728521, at *4 (Del Ch. Aug. 2, 2004).
126. See id. at *3-4.
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even in the most extreme cases, at least if the case does not involve
independence of a special litigation committee. To establish lack of
independence, personal friendship has to "border on ... familial loy-
alty and closeness."127 In Stewart, where the Delaware Supreme
Court evaluated director independence to consider a pre-suit demand,
the directors and Stewart were part of "the same social circles, at-
tended the same weddings, developed business relationships before
joining the board, and described each other as friends." 128 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff showed that one of the directors had attended Stew-
art's lawyer's daughter's wedding reception along with Stewart and
that Fortune had published an article focusing on the close personal
relationships between the directors and Stewart. 129 Still, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court found that all of this was not enough to rebut the
presumption of independence.13 0 The court explained "[t]hat a much
stronger relationship is necessary to overcome the presumption of in-
dependence at the demand futility stage."131 This rule is "especially
compelling when one considers the risks that directors would take by
protecting their social acquaintances in the face of allegations that
those friends engaged in misconduct."132 The court seems to believe
that directors sufficiently fear lawsuits for breaches of fiduciary duty
to set aside their loyalty to a personal friend.
In In re J.P. Morgan Chase, the Delaware Chancery Court ex-
plained that even though a director's son was employed by the com-
pany, this did not make the director lose his independence because
the director's son was not an executive officer of the company and
also did not live in the same household as the director.133
d. Merger Approval
The analysis of board independence in the context of a merger ap-
proval is slightly more practical. Besides making the determination of
individual board member independence, the courts investigate
whether the board actually acted in an independent manner. In Kahn
v. Lynch Communication Systems, a special committee had been set
up to consider the merger of the company to another company, which
127. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050
(Del. 2004).
128. Id. at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 1045.
130. Id. at 1051.
131. Id. at 1052.
132. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052.
133. In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 823 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd,
906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2006).
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was also its controlling shareholder.134 The Delaware Supreme Court
found that the special committee was not independent for two rea-
sons. First, the committee's mandate was unclear-it did not have the
full power to conduct the negotiations independently. Second, the
committee did not have real bargaining power to say no to the offer
made by the controlling shareholder because of the threat made by
the controlling shareholder of a hostile tender offer.'3 5
e. Business Relationships and Charitable Relationships
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, "Allegations of . . . a
mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt about a director's independence" in the de-
mand futility context.136 The Delaware Chancery Court, for its part,
has held, also in the context of demand futility, that a material busi-
ness relationship with another company with which a director is affili-
ated cannot result, generally, in the director's losing her
independence.137 The exception arises if the specific manager, to
whom the director is allegedly beholden, exercises control over the
company or its relationship with the other company with which the
director is affiliated.' 38 Also, the materiality threshold requires that
the plaintiff does more than merely allege that the substantial viability
of the director's affiliate company depends on the business
relationship.139
In In re J.P. Morgan Chase, the Delaware Chancery Court also
found, in the context of demand futility, that a director's stock owner-
ship in a large corporation, of which the director was the former CEO,
was not enough to establish that the director was not independent.140
As to charitable relationships, the court held that the plaintiff has to
show a connection between the director and the charitable contribu-
tion beyond the director's sitting on the board of the charity that has
received contributions from the company.141
134. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1112-13 (Del. 1994).
135. Id. at 1118-20.
136. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
137. See, e.g., In re J.P. Morgan Chase, 906 A.2d at 822-23.
138. See, e.g., id. at 822.
139. Jacobs v. Yang, No. Civ.A. 206-N, 2004 WL 1728521, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2004).
140. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase, 906 A.2d at 820-22.
141. Id. at 822.
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f. Independence of a Special Litigation Committee
In the context of a special litigation committee, the threshold for
independence is perhaps the highest. 142 However, the court must be
provided with specific facts to draw the conclusion that a specific com-
mittee member is not independent-mere conclusory statements by
the director that "[t]hose that got most of the gold make most of the
rules" do not suffice. 143
In Lewis v. Fuqua, the defendant failed to show that the special
litigation committee was independent. 144 Although he did not partici-
pate in the decision itself, the single member of the committee was a
board member when the challenged board action took place.145 This
member was, in fact, also a defendant in the pending lawsuit.146 In
addition, the member had numerous political and financial dealings
with the CEO who allegedly controlled the board.147 The member
was also president of Duke University, which had recently received a
$10 million contribution from the company.148 The CEO was also a
trustee of the university and had made several personal contributions
to the university in the past.149
In In re Oracle, the Delaware Chancery Court found that two mem-
bers of the special litigation committee were not independent. 50 This
was because they were both current board members of Oracle and
professors at Stanford University and they were supposed to investi-
gate fellow board members who also had significant ties to the univer-
sity.' 5 ' One of the targets of the investigation, also a professor at
Stanford, had been a professor to one of the special litigation commit-
tee members during the committee member's Ph.D. studies.152 An-
other target was a Stanford alumnus who had made millions of dollars
in contributions to Stanford, including contributions to an institute
142. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055
(Del. 2004) ("Unlike the demand-excusal context, where the board is presumed to be indepen-
dent, the SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must be
like Caesar's wife-above reproach." (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 964.
145. Id. at 965.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Lewis, 502 A.2d at 965.
150. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch. 2003).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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with which one of the special litigation committee members was
closely affiliated.153 The third target was the Oracle CEO who had
also donated millions to the university and was considering an addi-
tional $100 million donation at the time of formation of the special
litigation committee. 154
In re Oracle has been seen as setting a high standard for indepen-
dence, clearly distinguishing the special litigation committee indepen-
dence standard from other contexts, such as independence required to
consider a pre-suit demand or to approve a merger. Just a year before
the In re Oracle opinion was issued, the same court had stated, in the
context of a board decision to approve a cash-out merger, that "a
long-standing 15-year professional and personal relationship between
a director and the CEO and [the director and the] Chairman . .. were
insufficient to support a finding of control."155 This was so unless the
plaintiff could point to specific facts regarding "the length, nature or
extent of those previous relationships that would put in issue that di-
rector's ability to objectively consider the challenged transaction."' 5 6
The court mentioned employment benefits as a theoretical example
that could render the director with a sense of indebtedness to the con-
trolling person.'57
In California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Coulter, the
Delaware Chancery Court explained that even though personal
friendships outside business relationships and approving of or acqui-
escing in the challenged transactions are each, alone, insufficient to
establish lack of independence, an aggregate of them may well do the
trick. 58 The plaintiff succeeded in establishing a reasonable inference
of lack of independence of a special litigation committee member by
showing that the director and the CEO, who was also the largest sin-
gle shareholder, were lifelong friends.159 The livelihood of the son of
the director depended on the CEO because the son was the general
manager of the company's subsidiary.160 The director had approved
or acquiesced to all of the alleged self-dealing transactions of the
153. Id. at 920-21.
154. Id.
155. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 27 (Del. Ch. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 27 n.55.
157. Id.
158. See Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *9
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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CEO, and the director also benefited financially from some of the
self-dealing transactions.161
III. THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE AND CRITICISM THEREOF
Even without agreed standards on independence, board indepen-
dence has been presumed to improve company performance, not only
by the mass media-Sorkin, Hymowitz, Pulley, Grover, etc.-but also
by many of the academics and practitioners in the field of corporate
governance. Independent directors are perceived as an important
mechanism for reducing the agency costs created by separating owner-
ship from management.162 Among the first scholars to advocate in-
creasing board independence was William 0. Douglas, in 1934.163
Ahead of his time, Douglas emphasized that independent directors
must have the power to make decisions in the company to effectively
protect the interests of the shareholders.16 4 Much of what Douglas
advocated has become reality in the modern corporate governance
system.
As Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon has shown, the proportion of inde-
pendent directors on public company boards has been growing since
the 1950s, when it was a mere 20%, rapidly through the decades and
amounting to a staggering 75% in 2000.165 As Gordon has described:
Circa 1950, . . . [it was perceived] that boards should consist of the
firm's senior officers, some outsiders with deep connections with the
firm (such as its banker or its senior outside lawyer), and a few di-
rectors who were nominally independent but handpicked by the
CEO. Circa 2006,... [in contrast, boards ought to consist of] "inde-
pendent directors," whose independence is buttressed by a range of
rule-based and structural mechanisms. Inside directors are a dwin-
dling fraction; the senior outside lawyer on the board is virtually an
extinct species.166
In fact, as Bainbridge has remarked, the average public company
board today has only one insider-the CEO.167
Furthermore, independent directors are thought to have more in-
dustry-specific information that they have gained from sitting on
boards of other companies in the same industry, as compared to inside
161. Id.
162. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 190.
163. See generally William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305
(1934).
164. See id. at 1312-14.
165. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1471 (2007).
166. Id. at 1468.
167. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 188.
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directors.168 More generally, independent directors are perceived to
have better access to external resources that allow the firm to make
more informed decisions.169 Mace has embraced that the indepen-
dence requirement provides an effective check on management.170
According to him, only outside directors can provide true advice and
counsel, discipline management if required, effectively handle crises,
approve objectives and policies proposed by management, ask dis-
cerning questions, and critically evaluate the performance of
management.171
As for what the board's role should be, hot debate began in the
1970s, as Mitchell has described.172 A jumpstart for the discussion
came from Mace, who conducted an expansive research study on cor-
porate directors.'73 Mace found that there is a large gap between
what directors are supposed to do and what they actually do; rather
expressively, he called directors "ornaments on the corporate Christ-
mas tree."174 Mace found that directors did not typically devote much
time to board activities and that board members were, at best, a
source of information to management. 75 Board meetings were not
forums for active discussion arising out of the directors' questions;
rather, they were rituals to be performed according to a predeter-
mined script.176
Later on, Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg put forth the monitor-
ing board model, under which independent directors are a necessary
component for monitoring the managers (hiring and terminating the
CEO and senior officers, checking the corporation's auditing process
and voting on conflict-of-interest transactions) rather than
micromanaging the corporate affairs (acting on only the most impor-
tant corporate decisions).' 77 He noted that this model can work only
if the directors have access to accurate and reliable information and if
the majority of the board is independent.178 Eisenberg's model found
its way to the early versions of the American Law Institute's Princi-
168. Id. at 189.
169. See id. at 189-90.
170. See Mace, supra note 96, at 302-03.
171. Id.
172. Mitchell, supra note 97, at 27-35.
173. See generally MYLEs L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
174. Id. at 107.
175. See Mace, supra note 96, at 293-94.
176. See id. at 295-96.
177. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary,
37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 204-05 (1983).
178. Id. at 205.
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ples of Corporate Governance.179 However, as a response to harsh
criticism by industry participants, most importantly the Business
Roundtable, the ALI retracted its restatement-of-law-formed propo-
sal that included mandatory requirements.18 0 Instead, the ALI pro-
vided a final draft with mere recommendations.' 8 ' Among academics,
Professor Roberta S. Karmel criticized the ALI for presuming that the
interests of shareholders and of management are in conflict. Accord-
ing to her, managers and shareholders alike strive for efficiency and
profit, so no conflict exists. 182
According to the statement by the Business Roundtable in 1978,
corporations should have remained free to decide whether the partic-
ular situation of their enterprise demands a lesser amount of non-
management directors.183 Whereas Mace has criticized this caveat by
the Business Roundtable for rendering the requirement itself mean-
ingless,184 Professor Richard Epstein has noted that the optimal num-
ber of independent directors does depend on the nature of the
business. 85 In addition, the optimal number depends on the tradeoff
that has to be made between not having an additional inside director
on the board.186 Such an insider could provide valuable information
about the specifics of the business and the industry. 8 7 Epstein has
criticized the general attitude to perceive independent directors as
"some kind of holy water that can be sprinkled over a corporation to
save it from all sorts of intrigue on the part of its staff." 88
Perhaps due more to loyalty to their clients than to academic ambi-
tion, Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, and Karessa L. Cain of
Wachtell have also expressed skepticism as to whether excessive focus
on independence can lead to good board composition.189 According
to them, it could be hard to find independent directors who also have
the required expertise to be suitable for the task.190 As they have
179. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE-
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
180. See generally Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute
Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325 (1987).
181. Id. at 351.
182. Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 534, 551-52 (1984).
183. See Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2108 (1978).
184. Mace, supra note 96, at 297-98.
185. Richard A. Epstein, In Defence of the Corporation, 2004 N.Z. L. REV. 707, 719.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See Memorandum from Lipton et al., supra note 64, at 18.
190. Id.
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noted, "The reality is that directors who meet today's stringent stan-
dards of independence may be relatively inexperienced in the com-
pany's business and lack real expertise and understanding of relevant
industries and markets." 191 "The emphasis on director independence
should not cause the board to lose sight of the importance of a well-
functioning board and an effective partnership between the board and
senior management." 192
IV. - ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENCE
A. Why Focus on Independence Is Not Appropriate
1. The Incentive Problem
Scholars Paul Mallette and Karen Fowler, as well as scholar Rita D.
Kosnik, explain that under managerial hegemony theory, management
dominates the board regardless of how many independent directors
the board includes. 193 According to Mallette, Fowler, and Kosnik, the
independent board members are ineffective because they are selected
by management and, therefore, are likely to agree with the company's
current methods of operation.194 Second, outside directors have to
rely on the information provided to them by the management, espe-
cially company-specific, inside information. 195 Outside directors are
often CEOs of other companies and are likely not to challenge the
management decisions more than they would like to be challenged by
their own boards. This phenomenon is commonly called the structural
bias.
However, Eliezer M. Fich and Anil Shivdasani, scholars in financial
economics, tend to disagree. 196 According to the reputational capital
theory, independent directors of public corporations have a strong in-
centive to monitor the management: if the firm whose board they
serve faces a financial fraud lawsuit, the independent directors will
experience a decline in other directorships offered to them.197 There
are also a number of shaming mechanisms to which directors are sub-
ject, such as monitoring by shareholder activists and inclusion in the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Rita D. Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 171 (1987); Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of Board Composition
and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of "Poison Pills", 35 ACAD. MGMr. J. 1010, 1014 (1992).
194. See Kosnik, supra note 193, at 166-67; Mallette & Fowler, supra note 193, at 1014.
195. See Kosnik, supra note 193, at 167.
196. See generally Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation,
and Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. Ecow. 306 (2007).
197. See id. at 308.
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California Public Employees' Retirement System's annual focus list
on firms that have poor corporate governance. 98 This would seem to
give independent directors an external incentive to perform as inde-
pendently as possible.
As Charles M. Elson and Michael C. Jensen have noted, even
though independent directors would not have an inherent incentive to
monitor the management and thereby promote shareholder interests,
this could be changed if independent directors were required to own
stock in the company.199 Outside directors who are also major share-
holders in the company are widely used in both Germany and Japan
where banks act dually as lenders and shareholders for their clients, as
Professor Laura Lin has noted. 200 In fact, the Delaware Supreme
Court has given special deference to outside directors who held sub-
stantial equity stakes in a corporation that was the target of a take-
over.201 As Clarke has noted, outside directors also being
shareholders of the company is generally perceived as a positive thing
under United States corporate law.202
Traditionally, companies have compensated directors for board
membership at a flat fee, unaffected by the company performance. 203
Moreover, directors usually earn significant compensation from their
primary occupation outside the directorship.204 Perhaps a more realis-
198. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 171.
199. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 937, 939 (1993); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864-65 (1993).
200. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 919-21 (1996).
201. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380 (Del. 1995) ("The subjec-
tive premise was the Court of Chancery's sua sponte determination that Unitrin's outside direc-
tors, who are also substantial stockholders, would not vote like other stockholders in a proxy
contest, i.e., in their own best economic interests.").
202. See Clarke, supra note 25, at 81-82.
203. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 135-56 (1996) (explaining the
history of director compensation). While studies on board compensation show that equity com-
pensation of boards has increased, most companies still compensate their directors at least partly
in cash. See Harley E. Ryan Jr. & Roy A. Wiggins III, Who Is in Whose Pocket? Director Com-
pensation, Board Independence, and Barriers to Effective Monitoring, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 497,
517-20 (2004) (finding that the proportion of cash in board compensation decreased by 20% and
the proportion of equity increased by 78% between 1995 and 1997 in a sample of 600 public
companies). Jack Dolmat-Connell and Gerry Miller have argued that the form of board com-
pensation should depend on the perceived role of the board. Jack Dolmat-Connell & Gerry
Miller, What Should We Pay Board Members for?, DIRS. & Bos., Sept. 22, 2008, at 34, 34. If the
main responsibility of directors is to monitor the management, their compensation should be in
cash. Id. If the board's main role, in contrast, is to improve company performance, the compen-
sation should be in equity. Id.
204. Lin, supra note 200, at 916.
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tic alternative to requiring directors to buy stock would be to compen-
sate them with stock instead of cash, as proposed by Elson.205 As
such, the interests of the directors would be aligned with those of the
shareholders rather than those of the management. 206 Gordon, how-
ever, has noted that stock compensation may create perverse incen-
tives for directors similar to those of the CEOs who engage in
aggressive accounting methods to boost their incentive-based compen-
sation.207 According to Bainbridge, restricted stock is the best com-
pensation alternative because it gives the directors the incentive to
improve the firm performance and avoid losses. 20s
2. Empirical Evidence
In light of the trend towards more independence, scholars have
asked whether there is evidence showing that director independence
actually makes companies perform better. Results of empirical stud-
ies are mixed.209 Some scholars, such as Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey
G. Wyatt, have found a positive share price reaction to nominations of
independent directors. 210 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S.
Weisbach have shown that when a firm performs poorly, insider direc-
tors are more likely to resign from the board and outsiders are more
likely to be added.211 According to Hermalin and Weisbach, this
could possibly be because after insiders, who are responsible for the
poor performance, are removed, the firms fill these vacancies (for the
lack of good insider candidates) by recruiting outside directors;212 oth-
erwise, this could be because outsiders are added or specifically due to
their being better at monitoring management, and to make room for
these outsiders, inside directors had to be removed.213 However, it
would seem that these studies merely confirm that shareholders pre-
sume performance improvement due to director independence and
that boards are aware of this presumption. 214 Gordon has concluded
205. See Elson, supra note 203, at 164-73.
206. See id.
207. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1487-88.
208. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 170.
209. See Note, Beyond "Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Indepen-
dence, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1553, 1553 (2006).
210. See generally Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Indepen-
dence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. Ecow. 175 (1990).
211. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composi-
tion, 19 RAND J. ECON. 589, 604-05 (1988).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 605.
214. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259,
1284-85 (1982).
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that there is no correlation between having independent board mem-
bers and better firm performance; however, in the aggregate, having
independent directors improves the overall economy by making the
capital markets more efficient. 215
Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. Butler found that adding inde-
pendent board members has a positive net effect on the firm perform-
ance up to their accounting for 30% of the total board size, but that
adding independent board members beyond that had a negative effect
on firm performance. 216 In another study, they found that the positive
reaction in firm performance may come with delay and that board
composition is merely one of many mechanisms in controlling man-
agement.217 Also, Michael H. Schellenger, David D. Wood, and
Ahmad Tashakori found a positive correlation between independent
directors and firm performance. 218
However, these studies finding some degree of positive correlation
are far outnumbered by studies that found a negative correlation or
no correlation between the two variables.219 For example, Hermalin
and Weisbach have, in a later study, found that there is no significant
correlation between board composition and firm performance. 220
Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black found in their study of a large sam-
ple of public companies over an extended period of time that, even
though firms with poor performance tended to add more independent
directors to remedy their poor performance, this strategy did not help.
In fact, the companies possibly performed worse as a result.221 These
authors also noted that adding insiders on the board had a positive
effect on the firm performance. 222
215. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1468-69.
216. Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation
Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557, 575-76
(1984).
217. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101,
119-21 (1985).
218. Michael H. Schellenger et al., Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and
Dividend Policy, 15 J. MGmr. 457, 462-65 (1989).
219. See, e.g., Idalene F. Kesner & Roy B. Johnson, An Investigation of the Relationship Be-
tween Board Composition and Stockholder Suits, 11 STRATEGIC MGmr. J. 327, 332-34 (1990)
(noting that the evidence on the existence of a correlation is mixed); Lin, supra note 200, at
925-26.
220. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and
Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 FiN. MGMr. 101, 111 (1991).
221. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CoRP. L. 231, 248 (2002).
222. Id. at 263-64.
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B. If Independence Is Not the Proper Focus, What Is?
Based on theories and empirical studies discussed, it may be the
case that the assumption that board independence improves company
performance is misplaced. The question arises, therefore, as to what
may be the proper focus if not independence. Key scholar Professor
Lawrence E. Cunningham has proposed that it should be accounting
expertise. 223 In fact, empirical studies unanimously show that exper-
tise significantly improves board effectiveness.224 For example, ac-
counting experience on the part of board audit committee members
has been found to reduce accounting earnings management. Anup
Agrawal and Sahiba Chadha have found that companies that have in-
dependent board or audit committee members with financial expertise
are less likely to restate their earnings.225 Lawrence J. Abbott, Susan
Parker, and Gary F. Peters have likewise found a negative correlation
between having one or more financial experts on the audit committee
and the company restating its earnings.226 Andrew J. Felo, Srinivasan
Krishnamurthy, and Steven A. Solieri have found that financial exper-
tise of audit committee members improves the accuracy of the com-
pany's financial reports.227 Gopal V. Krishnan and Gnanakumar
Visvanathan have found a positive correlation between audit commit-
tee member accounting expertise and accounting conservatism; inter-
estingly, such correlation was not found to exist between general
financial expertise and accounting conservatism. 228
223. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 465 (2008).
224. Id. at 466.
225. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48
J.L. & ECON. 371, 374 (2005).
226. See Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and Restatements, 23 Au-
DITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 69 (2004).
227. See generally Andrew J. Felo et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived
Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=401240.
228. Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the SOX Definition of an Ac-
counting Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit Committee Directors' Accounting Ex-
pertise and Accounting Conservatism, 25 CONTEMP. Accr. REs. 827, 851 (2008). Some studies
have shown that, in the specific context of financial disclosures, independence may have a slight
positive effect. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 223, at 473. This may, however, be due to the
fact that accounting experts are usually outsiders to the firm (and the two qualities of expertise
and independence thus coincide in this narrow context). See id. at 474. Therefore, it is doubtful
whether independence, even in this context, has any added effect. See id. at 483-94. There is a
strong negative correlation between board independence and accounting fraud. See, e.g., id. at
478; see also Abbot et al., supra note 226, at 70; Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 225, at 374;
Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How
Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEo. L.J. 1843, 1872-73 (2007). But see Felo et al., supra note
227, at 25-26 (finding a positive correlation). In addition, board independence was positively
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Cunningham has focused on arguing for the development of more
stringent requirements of accounting expertise in public company
board audit committees.229 Even though it is traditionally perceived
that expertise and independence are mutually exclusive qualities, this
is not the case in audit committees because directors do not have to
gain general accounting expertise from inside the company or even
the industry.230 On this point, Cunningham has distinguished corpo-
rate knowledge that executives have because of their tenure with a
specific firm, i.e. status expertise, from expertise on a given subject
matter.231
Also, the SOX definition of expertise in terms of formal training
and accounting experience is in stark contrast to the general amor-
phous definition of independence that has been traditionally applied,
by courts, for example.232 Cunningham notes that even though the
focus has so far been on accounting expertise, in the future, the focus
could shift to other kinds of expertise as well; for example, members
of the nominating committee could be required to have experience in
designing executive compensation structures and market knowledge
in executive recruitment.233
Interestingly, even though expertise enhances board performance,
law discourages expertise by imposing a higher standard of liability on
the more expert board members. In In re Emerging Communications,
the Delaware Chancery Court held a director who was the only one
on the board who had financial expertise to a higher standard than
nonexpert board members in evaluating the fairness of the merger
price in a cash-out merger.234 The director had voted for the merger
at a price of $10.25 per share even though the court viewed that the
director (being a principal and general partner of an investment advis-
ing firm, with significant experience in finance and the telecommuni-
cations sector) was "in a unique position to know that" the company
could get as much as $20 per share. 235 The director had also made a
related to the market's favorable reaction to the board announcements of earnings forecasts.
See Irene Karamanou & Nikos Vafeas, The Association Between Corporate Boards, Audit Com-
mittees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 43 J. Ac=r. RES. 453, 481
(2005).
229. Cunningham, supra note 223, at 467.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 494.
232. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006)), for the considerations of a financial expert under SOX.
233. Cunningham, supra note 223, at 484.
234. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at
*39-40 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
235. Id. at *39.
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statement to this effect.236 The court stated that the director should
have voted against the merger and advocated that the board reject the
unfair price.237
V. INDEPENDENCE IS CRUCIAL TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Although this Article has taken the position and provided support
for the proposition that, for ordinary, business-as-usual situations, ex-
pertise actually outweighs independence in regards to a board's con-
tribution to a company's performance, there are exceptions to this
rule. Even Cunningham has noted that, despite the general correla-
tion between board independence and poor corporate performance,
there is slightly more evidence that independence enhances the per-
formance of specific tasks of the board.238 According to Mace, the
role of directors changes from an advisory one to that of decision
makers when the CEO dies suddenly and the board has to select a
successor or when the CEO's performance is so unsatisfactory that the
CEO has to be changed.239
Lin's survey of empirical studies on the effects of board indepen-
dence in specific corporate crises tends to support Cunningham's con-
clusion.240 According to Lin, board composition has a positive effect
in the following scenarios. First, when a firm is performing poorly, a
board with more outside directors is more likely to dismiss the
CEO.241 Second, boards with more outside directors are more likely
to adopt efficient executive compensation plans, including greater use
of equity-based compensation and lesser use of management perks in
slow markets. 242 Third, independent boards make more shareholder-
wealth-increasing decisions on adopting poison pills than non-inde-
pendent boards.243 Independent boards also make better share-
holder-wealth-increasing decisions on greenmail, golden parachutes,
and management buyouts.244
It seems that crisis situations are when independent directors have
the greatest impact, as Bainbridge has remarked.245 A corporate scan-
dal may be the very type of crisis that the numerous scholars have
236. Id. at *39-40.
237. Id.
238. Cunningham, supra note 223, at 471-72.
239. Mace, supra note 96, at 295.
240. Lin, supra note 200, at 926-39.
241. Id. at 926-27.
242. Id. at 927-29.
243. Id. at 931-33.
244. Id. at 933-39.
245. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 194-95; see Mace, supra note 96, at 295.
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discussed. Even Perkins, who has been criticized the least for having
ties to the Murdochs or News Corporation has said, upon exiting the
board only months after the scandal began, that "if Rupert really
wants me to stay I will but I really don't want to."2 4 6 This did little to
emphasize his unbeholdenness to Rupert Murdoch. As this Article
has discussed in Part IV(A)(2), boards know that shareholders per-
ceive independence as a benefit. The News Corporation board could
have made at least a better show of independence for the benefit of
the shareholders. 247 In contrast to the Murdochs' commenting mini-
mally, primarily when testifying, the board could have commented
continually through press releases, providing updates and making
most of the internal investigation that News Corporation was con-
ducting.2 4 8 Whereas the two top managers of News of the World have
been arrested for allegedly participating in the criminal practices, the
board could also have terminated these managers, emphasizing poor
oversight as the cause and even presuming innocence on the part of
the managers. Finally, the board could be providing updates on im-
provements being devised and developed to improve information sys-
tems so as to prevent any future lapses in management oversight and
to ensure that the board finds out about such lapses earlier should
they occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even before stock exchanges required the majority of the board of
every noncontrolled, publicly-traded company to be independent as a
reaction to the Enron scandal, the proportion of independent direc-
tors on the board of the average public company had risen to an abso-
lute majority. This is because board independence has been
presumed, for many decades, to improve company performance by
academics and practitioners of the field. This presumption also seems
to be prevalent in the mass media-at least as is reflected in the dis-
cussion of the phone-hacking scandal involving News Corporation.
246. Hymowitz et al., supra note 5.
247. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson et al., Murdochs Take $1bn Hit on Share Falls, FIN.
TIMES (July 19, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eOb4dOcO-bl5e-11e0-9444-00144feab49a.html#a
xzzli3ZW7oeO (noting that News Corporation's share price plummeted 17.4% at the news of
the scandal).
248. News Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June 30, 2011) ("The Company has
taken steps to solve the problems relating to News of the World including the creation and estab-
lishment of an independent Management & Standards Committee (the "MSC"), which will have
oversight of, and take responsibility for, all matters in relation to the News of the World phone
hacking case, police payments and all other connected issues at News International Group Lim-
ited ("News International"), including as they may relate to other News International
publications.").
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The heralded benefits of director independence, some of which are
theorized, have ranged from more informed decisions to increased in-
dustry knowledge, better access to external resources, and, most
prominently, reduction of agency costs by providing an effective check
on management through monitoring. However, it has been found that
there is a large gap between what directors are supposed to do and
what most actually do.
Moreover, there is a lack of consensus on the exact definition of
independence; there is too little coherence between the standards im-
posed by federal law, the standard imposed by Delaware law, and the
standards of the stock exchanges. The SOX independence standard
for audit committee members is stringent and well-defined, but the
problem is that this standard has only a narrow application. The SEC
disclosure requirements seem to be fairly progressive, but the enforce-
ment mechanism for errors, short of clear fraud, is unsettled. The
main flaw of the stock exchange independence standards seems to be
that they capture neither personal relationships nor private dealings
between directors and managers because of the excessive focus on the
director's relationship with the company. Personal relationships be-
tween directors and members of the Murdoch family seemed to be the
criticism by the mass media as to most of the independent directors of
News Corporation, with the private transactions thought to be the
most compromising to independence. The state-law standard in Dela-
ware is the most board favorable and is also unclear because it is so
context specific. It is clear that none of the relationships between the
News Corporation directors and the Murdoch family members would
fail to meet the Delaware standard, except perhaps the standard for
the independence of a special litigation committee.
Even if board tasks and independence were better defined, incen-
tive theories explain well why independent board members still might
not actually be good monitors. There are some solutions available to
remedy the lack of incentives-such as more widespread adoption of
restricted stock as primary compensation for board members-but it
seems fairly clear, based on the expansive empirical evidence, that the
independence of board members has little or no effect on the per-
formance of a company. However, exceptions exist for certain corpo-
rate crises, of which the Murdoch scandal is an example.
It is probably unfounded, based on the data from the studies, for
the mass media to presume that greater independence of the News
Corporation directors would have resulted in the directors' advise-
ment of a better acquisition strategy. However, it is likely that the
directors would have provided a timelier, strategically better response
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to the phone-hacking scandal. For better acquisition strategies and
perhaps better oversight of the managers of News of the World, MyS-
pace, or Dow Jones, director expertise would probably be a better
point of focus than independence. There has been a trend towards
increasing expertise requirements, and this will most likely continue in
the future. Perhaps there will be a time when Natalie Bancroft would
not qualify for membership on the board of a global news conglomer-
ate, at least not based on her primary occupation as an opera singer.

